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ABSTRACT
Trade is a major source of employment. Nevertheless, trade 
has recently been caught in the crossfire in discussions 
around the decline of manufacturing employment and the 
polarization of labor markets in advanced economies. In this 
chapter we examine what the academic literature has to say 
on the relationship between trade and labor markets, with 
a specific focus on studies with a value chain perspective. 
We find that trade has only modest effects on aggregate 
employment and is unlikely to have been a major contrib-
utor to the decline of manufacturing. However, the effects 
vary considerably across regions and individuals with dif-
ferent skill levels. This implies that policy has a central role 
to play in making sure that the gains from trade are shared 
evenly. Our findings highlight that a value chain perspec-
tive is important for assessing the impact of trade on labor 
markets. The emergence of value chains has strengthened 
linkages between sectors, magnified trade’s impact on skill 
demand and requires novel trade statistics. Ignoring this 
leads to a biased view of trade and overestimates its role in 
the decline of manufacturing employment.
• Factoring in GVCs when studying the impact of trade on labor markets reveals that trade has not 
been a significant contributor to declines in manufacturing jobs in advanced economies, and that 
job gains in services have offset job losses in manufacturing.
• However, the effects of trade can vary considerably across regions and individuals with different 
skill levels, compounding regional disparities and labor market polarization driven by other factors 
such as automation. 
• Adjustment policies should not differentiate between the various reasons for worker displacement, 
such as automation or trade, and should be less dependent on affected workers fulfilling certain 
conditions.
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1. Introduction
Trade is a major source of employment in advanced economies. Estimates suggest that exports supported 12 million jobs in 2014 in the United States alone.1 The importance of exports for employment becomes even 
more apparent when expressed in terms of shares. Figure 2.1 
shows that exports may account for almost 50% of jobs in Ireland 
and around 30% of jobs in Germany. Similarly, imports can con-
tribute to employment. By reducing the costs of production, they 
can lead to higher demand which can translate into more jobs.2 
In addition, jobs supported by imports or exports pay a signif-
icant premium when compared to jobs supported by domestic 
demand. Martins and Opromolla (2011) find that average wages 
are up to 30% higher in exporting and importing plants com-
pared to non-trading plants.
Despite this positive role, trade has recently been caught in the 
crossfire in the discussion around the decline of manufacturing 
employment in advanced economies. In fact, foreign competition 
has been blamed for job and income losses for many decades. 
In particular the rise of new economic powerhouses has tradi-
tionally caused popular backlashes against liberal trade regimes 
in incumbent countries leading to policies that increase barriers 
to imports. Examples reach from the British Merchandise Marks 
Act of 1887 targeted at German imports to Japan’s 1981 volun-
tary export restraints. Today, import competition from emerging 
markets and formerly planned Eastern European economies has 
been mentioned among the main factors behind the labor market 
adjustments that have taken place over the last decades. A series 
of recent empirical studies find that trade liberalization epi-
sodes have had a detrimental impact on labor market outcomes. 
A prominent role in this regard has been given to China’s WTO 
accession in 2001 (Autor et al., 2013; Pierce and Schott, 2016), 
the conclusion of NAFTA in 1994 (Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016), 
and the EU enlargement in 2004 (Braakmann and Vogel, 2011).
Since the results of these studies are contrary to the common 
view among economists that trade has only minor employment 
impacts,3 several literature surveys have recently re-examined the 
role of international trade for labor market outcomes to reach a 
conclusive and comprehensive assessment of trade’s impact on 
employment and wages.4 This chapter summarizes the findings 
of these surveys but, crucially, also sheds light on a topic that has 
not received sufficient attention in recent articles: the impact of 
the expansion of value chains on the relationship between trade 
and labor markets.
As discussed in the first chapter of this report and its 2017 
predecessor, the rise of domestic and international production 
fragmentation has proceeded rapidly in recent decades. Firms 
have unbundled their factories and outsourced production 
stages across the globe. This has major implications for the inter-
actions between trade and labor markets, and it is important to 
examine them separately from the wider trade and labor market 
discussion to fully understand their effects. Three main conse-
quences of value chains can be highlighted.
Firstly, the impact of import competition on labor markets is 
not limited to import-competing industries anymore. Instead, 
downstream customers and upstream suppliers are affected 
much more than in a non-fragmented economy. Therefore, 
trade shocks propagate more widely through the economy than 
in the past. For instance, when an industry contracts due to for-
eign competition this will hurt its upstream supplier industries 
and the suppliers’ suppliers since they will face lower demand. 
FIGURE 2.1 Domestic employment supported by exports
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Notes: Authors’ calculations based on 2014 data from the World Input Output Database (WIOD). For the methodology please refer to Calì et al. (2016). Direct 
refers to employment supported in exporting establishments using the share of exports in total output of these establishments. Indirect refers to employment 
supported in establishments that supply exporters and depend on foreign demand via these supply linkages. In many countries more than half of the jobs sup-
ported by exports are due to indirect value chain linkages.
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Downstream customers, on the other hand, could benefit from 
cheaper inputs that foreign competition implies. As a result, it is 
necessary to take into account input-output linkages between 
industries as well as the position of industries in the value 
chain when analyzing the effect of trade on labor markets. This 
becomes strikingly clear when looking at Figure 2.1. It shows that 
in several advanced economies more than half of the jobs sup-
ported by exports are not within exporting establishments but 
within supplier establishments.
Secondly, the expansion of value chains entails not only sec-
tors that compete across countries but also tasks and stages. This 
means that competition happens at a much finer level with severe 
consequences for skill demand within countries. The production 
of many goods takes place in various stages that require different 
levels of skills. Value chains allow unbundling these stages spa-
tially so that countries well-endowed in skilled (unskilled) labor 
can specialize in skilled (unskilled)-intensive stages. This shifts 
aggregate skill demand much more than traditional trade, which 
required all stages with their different intensities to be performed 
domestically, and might lead to an increased polarization of the 
labor market.
Thirdly, value chains imply that traditional gross trade sta-
tistics are insufficient to properly assess the impact of trade on 
labor markets because they mis-measure the scale and scope of 
import competition. For example, when firms offshore assembly 
stages but keep upstream stages domestic, gross import statis-
tics heavily overstate import competition because they suggest 
that the complete value chain was offshored. Even if all stages are 
offshored, gross import statistics tend to falsely assign competi-
tion to downstream industries because they suggest that the full 
value of an imported good has been created by the downstream 
exporting industry when in fact much of the value is supplied by 
foreign upstream industries. This causes competition to be over-
stated downstream but understated upstream.
Due to these three changes, a comprehensive overview of the 
impact of trade on labor markets requires a value chain perspec-
tive. Moreover, a value chain perspective is not only relevant to 
correctly assess whether trade boosts employment and wages 
or not, but it also changes subsequent policy recommendations. 
For example, when trade shocks spread more widely within econ-
omies and when competition moves to ever finer degrees, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to target individuals hurt by trade.
This chapter discusses the three changes and their implica-
tions for the relationship between trade and labor markets and 
for adjustment policies along four major debates surrounding 
labor markets in advanced economies. The four debates concern 
the role of trade in:
• the decline of manufacturing employment, 
• nation-wide employment trends, 
• the rise in regional inequality, and 
• the increase in labor market polarization. 
In each case, the discussion starts with a summary of the 
results of studies that do not take value chains into account and 
then highlights the additional insights that value chain studies can 
add.
The chapter shows that trade is likely to raise aggregate 
employment and real wages and that taking a value chain per-
spective is important. In particular, cost savings due to cheap 
imports and export opportunities create employment in many 
sectors of the economy that do not trade directly but benefit 
from trade through input-output linkages. Even when the focus is 
on the manufacturing sector, the evidence paints a more benign 
picture of trade which contrasts with popular perception. Once 
the rise of value chains is properly accounted for, it suggests 
that trade has contributed at best a relatively small share to the 
decline of manufacturing employment in advanced economies. 
Trade has, however, contributed to regional and individual 
disparities. Since industries tend to cluster regionally, studies 
show that the impact of trade is very heterogeneous across geo-
graphic areas. While trade benefits labor markets in regions with 
exporting industries and industries that rely on imported inputs, 
it might hurt regions that compete directly with foreign pro-
ducers. Therefore, it leads to a spatial divergence in economic 
activity. Similarly, trade is shown to increase the demand for skills 
and, thus, has uneven effects across individuals, a trend that 
has been aggravated by the rise of value chains. This is where 
policy intervention has the potential to play an important role. 
The right interventions can spread the gains from trade more 
evenly and guarantee that regions and individuals are not hurt 
by globalization.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the role 
of trade in the decline of manufacturing employment. Section 3 
assesses how trade affects aggregate nationwide labor market 
outcomes. Section 4 examines the impact of trade on regional 
inequality. Section 5 analyses the impact on skill demand and the 
polarization of the labor market. Section 6 proposes potential 
policy responses. Section 7 concludes. 
2. Trade, GVCs, and the decline of 
manufacturing employment
One of the most contested issues in the trade and labor market 
debate is whether and by how much imports have contributed 
to the decline of manufacturing employment in advanced econ-
omies vis-à-vis alternative factors such as technology-driven 
productivity improvements or changes in preferences towards 
services. Across all high-income economies the share of man-
ufacturing employment in total employment has been steadily 
declining for decades which has attracted considerable atten-
tion, potentially due to the fact the manufacturing jobs pay a 
premium even after controlling for a variety of worker character-
istics (Langdon and Lehrman, 2012). In the public debate, trade 
has been and continues to be listed as a prime culprit behind job 
losses in the manufacturing sector.
Economic studies from the 1990s and early 2000s show in this 
regard that after a trade shock, employment in import-compet-
ing industries suffers relative to employment in export-oriented 
sectors (e.g. Revenga, 1992). More recent studies focusing on the 
effects of rising Chinese import competition on US labor markets 
48 • Technological innovation, supply chain trade, and workers in a globalized world
find similar results and have sparked a heated debate around 
the role of trade in explaining the loss of manufacturing jobs. US 
manufacturing employment was stable around 18 million workers 
between 1965 and 2000 before falling by 18 percent between 
2001 and 2007. Estimates of the share of this loss of jobs due 
to trade based on “back-of-the-envelope” calculations in popu-
lar media outlets, blogs and policy briefs range between 1 and 
20 per cent (De Long, 2017; Krugman, 2016b; Hicks and Devaraj, 
2015) with one author going as far as to claim that the growing 
manufacturing trade deficit of the United States can explain 
almost all of the manufacturing jobs lost in the period between 
2000 and 2007 (Scott, 2015). 
More rigorous economic analyses support the claim that 
trade has played a limited role, explaining at the very most one 
quarter of the recent decline. Seminal work in this area by Autor 
et al. (2013), who examine the increase in Chinese import compe-
tition by comparing more and less exposed local labor markets 
in the United States, finds that it can explain around 25 per cent 
of the manufacturing decline. Studies based on this work show 
that similar but less pronounced trends can be observed in sev-
eral European countries (Donoso et al., 2015; Balsvik et al., 2015; 
Malgouyres, 2017). There is also evidence of large productivity 
gains in advanced economies from trading with China, however 
with substantial job losses in exposed industries (Ahn and Duval, 
2017). Another study shows that detrimental effects on employ-
ment in manufacturing in the United States arose because of the 
elimination of tariff uncertainty rather than tariff reduction after 
China’s WTO entry (Pierce and Schott, 2016). 
One explanation could be that advanced economies react to 
increased import-competition in manufactured goods by spe-
cializing in the tradable services sector, such as business ser-
vices, R&D, design or financial services, in which they typically 
have a comparative advantage (Spence and Hlatshwayo, 2012). 
The trade-induced shift from a manufacturing- to services-based 
economy is however not found to happen smoothly at the micro-
level. Indeed, considering the movements of workers between 
sectors in Germany, there is little evidence that the increasing 
employment in service industries comes from incumbent man-
ufacturing workers who directly switch jobs without undergoing 
an unemployment spell. Instead, the rise of services is found to 
be driven by young labor market entrants who exhibit different 
sectoral entry behaviours than previous generations, and by 
returnees out of non-employment who take up jobs in different 
industries than their previous one (Dauth et al., 2018).
However, many factors other than trade have been boosting 
the non-tradeable sector in advanced economies over time. For 
instance, changing demand patterns caused by demographic 
change and increased incomes favour services over manufac-
turing. Moreover, Bernard and Fort (2017) suggest that part of 
the manufacturing decline is due to a statistical misconception, 
because some firms are counted as wholesalers despite their 
involvement in the production of goods, with Apple Inc. serv-
ing as a prime example. By re-classifying these firms as manu-
facturers, up to two million jobs in the US can be shown to have 
switched from services to manufacturing in 2007. Even more 
remarkable is that half of the decline of manufacturing employ-
ment in Denmark between 1994 and 2007 is due to firms switch-
ing their sectoral affiliation from manufacturing to services which 
implies that no actual job loss has taken place in these instances 
(Bernard et al., 2017).
Importantly, trade implies not just import competition but 
also export opportunities and cheaper inputs. According to 
recent work, the global export expansion of US manufactur-
ing products, which was supported by cheap Chinese inputs 
into US production, almost completely offset job losses due to 
import competition from China (Feenstra et al., 2017). In Ger-
many, new export opportunities in Central Eastern Europe 
have even slowed down the decline of manufacturing employ-
ment despite rising import competition (Dauth et al., 2018). In 
addition, Chinese imports and offshoring have reduced prices 
in the US considerably (Amiti et al., 2017; Handley and Limao, 
2018). This is likely to lead to significant cost savings for firms 
and higher consumer spending. Evidence shows that these cost 
reductions enabled import-competing US manufacturing firms 
to shift resources to industries in which they enjoy a comparative 
advantage relative to China. This has led, in turn, to an increase 
in overall manufacturing employment and wages among these 
firms (Magyari, 2017). Cost savings have also enabled offshor-
ing firms to expand onshore employment, leading to overall 
employment gains in offshoring industries (Kovak et al., 2017). 
According to recent evidence, higher consumer spending in 
addition with other indirect effects, such as the between-region 
elasticity of labor supply, can even fully cancel out manufac-
turing employment losses due to Chinese import competition 
(Adao et al., 2019).
Another important issue brings us finally to the importance 
of a value chain perspective in the analysis. Value chains have 
spread considerably over the last decades both domestically and 
internationally. The average share of in-house production in total 
output decreased by 8% from 1995 to 2011, indicating an on-go-
ing fragmentation process.5 This spatial unbundling of produc-
tion has profound implications for the impact of trade on labor 
market outcomes. Ignoring these implications can lead to severe 
mismeasurement of the impact of trade shocks on employment 
and wages.
The foremost reason why it is important to take value chains 
into account when assessing the impact of trade on labor market 
outcomes is that the spread of value chains within and across 
countries has strengthened inter- and intra-industry linkages 
considerably over the last decades. These linkages imply that 
trade shocks propagate through the economy much more than 
in a vertically integrated world. Evidence from Belgium shows 
for instance that while only 7.3% of Belgian firms export, 42.4% 
supply exporters directly or indirectly and are thus dependent 
on foreign demand (Dhyne and Rubinova, 2016). Even more strik-
ingly, 97% of all Belgian firms are dependent on foreign inputs 
even though only 15% import directly (Tintelnot et al., 2017). As 
a result, looking only at exporting and import-competing firms 
or industries when examining the trade and labor market rela-
tionship means missing a major part of the picture.
Trade, value chains and labor markets in advanced economies • 49
In this context, researchers have revisited the seminal work 
by Autor et al. (2013) that examines the effect of Chinese import 
competition on labor market outcomes in US commuting zones. 
In contrast to the original study, the new work considers as 
exposed not only industries that produce the products that the 
US imports from China but also these industries’ upstream sup-
plier and downstream customer industries (Wang et al., 2018). 
It thus takes a value chain perspective. The hypothesis is that 
supplier industries are hurt by import competition when their 
customers contract because the demand for their products 
decreases. Customer industries, on the other hand, might ben-
efit from import competition affecting their suppliers since they 
can reduce their costs by switching from domestic to cheaper 
foreign suppliers, which can raise demand for their products 
and subsequently employment. This would be in line with recent 
findings showing that firms that source more inputs from abroad 
expand production and increase domestic sourcing as well 
(Antràs et al., 2017).
Extending the definition of import exposure in this value 
chain consistent manner attenuates the findings by Autor et al. 
(2013) for manufacturing employment. Wang et al. (2018) find 
that commuting zones more exposed to Chinese imports fare 
only slightly worse in terms of manufacturing employment and 
real wage growth than less exposed regions. This is mainly due 
to employment creation in downstream industries that expand, 
potentially due to cheaper inputs. Directly exposed industries 
and upstream industries face relative employment and wage 
losses. These combined losses are however balanced out by the 
downstream gains, leading to a small negative impact of imports 
on manufacturing.
Other studies have performed similar exercises with different 
methodologies that take input-output linkages into account but 
have failed to observe positive effects on downstream indus-
tries of the same magnitude (Acemoglu et al., 2016; Caliendo 
et al., 2018). They nevertheless suggest that the contribution 
of Chinese import competition to the decline of US manufac-
turing from 2000 to 2007 is about one third smaller than the 
corresponding value by Autor et al. (2013) who do not have a 
value chain perspective. The difference regarding the magnitude 
of downstream effects is likely due to an improper measure of 
downstream and upstream exposure in the latter studies.6,7
The difference in results across these studies raises a second 
important point. In the age of GVCs, gross trade statistics can 
be misleading because they ignore complex cross-border pro-
duction linkages which are better accounted for by trade in 
value added statistics as highlighted by chapter 1 of this report. 
In particular, recent research highlights that by relying on gross 
trade data many studies on Chinese import competition ignore 
the high amount of US value added in Chinese exports to the 
US, the high services and primary sector content in manufac-
turing exports, as well as double counting due to back-and-
forth trade.8 Figure 2.2 illustrates this point by showing that the 
FIGURE 2.2 Value added sources of Chinese manufacturing exports
(% share of exports)
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Notes: Author’s calculations based on ADB-WIOD data for 2015. The chart highlights that the majority of value added in an industry’s manufacturing exports is 
sourced from other industries, in many cases outside of manufacturing.
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majority of value added in manufacturing exports is not added 
in the exporting industry but in upstream industries, including 
services. These three factors limit import competition exposure 
of manufacturing industries considerably. When using the more 
appropriate value-added trade statistics, the effect of Chinese 
import competition is reduced by about one third (Jakubik and 
Stolzenburg, 2018).
In sum, once exports, input-output linkages, and value-added 
trade statistics are accounted for, trade seems to have contrib-
uted to the recent decline in manufacturing employment in 
advanced economies only to a very small degree, if at all. In fact, 
trade even slowed the decline down in some countries, such as 
Germany. Separate from this, and potentially more important, 
is the question of how trade has affected the overall number of 
jobs across all sectors. After all, manufacturing is only responsi-
ble for a minor share of overall employment in most advanced 
economies. This question is discussed in the next section.
3. Trade, GVCs, and nation-wide labor market 
outcomes
As said above, other sectors than manufacturing make up for 
most of employment in advanced economies, in particular the 
services sector. Since more and more services become tradable 
or linked to foreign competition and demand through input-out-
put linkages, aggregate labor market effects of trade have 
become increasingly distinct from its effect on manufacturing. 
This further highlights the importance of a value chain perspec-
tive for assessments of the trade and labor market relationship.
Theories of international trade typically suggest that trade 
should not have a major effect on the aggregate level of employ-
ment. They tend to predict that trade has second order effects 
by shifting resources across firms and sectors, which can affect 
aggregate employment if labor market frictions are sector or 
firm-specific (Helpman and Itskhoki, 2010; Davis and Harrigan, 
2011; Carrère et al., 2015). They stress however that the dominant 
determinant of unemployment is country-, sector- and firm-spe-
cific labor market institutions.
Descriptive statistics are broadly in line with what economic 
theory predicts. In contrast to a relatively widespread perception 
in developed countries, trends in aggregate labor market out-
comes, such as labor force participation, employment-to-pop-
ulation ratios, the unemployment rate or real wages have not 
shown dramatic changes since the early 1990s, other than 
those related to the Great Recession (World Trade Organization 
(WTO), 2017). There is no increasing trend in unemployment or 
decreasing trend in labor force participation that is common to 
developed countries and could potentially be related to glo-
balization or more specifically to the expansion of North-South 
trade. What can be observed however, are differences in the 
levels of employment indicators across countries, which suggests 
that country-specific factors play an important role in explaining 
labor market outcomes.
Of course, theory can be based on false assumptions and 
descriptive statistics can be misleading. Therefore, it is important 
to examine the empirical literature to see if it confirms the pre-
dictions. Different methodologies have been applied to assess 
the relationship between trade and aggregate employment, and 
all are broadly in line with theory and simple correlations. For 
instance, cross-country econometric studies that estimate the 
effect of changes in trade policy or trade openness on changes in 
employment find that trade shocks reduce unemployment mod-
estly. A 1 per cent decrease in tariffs is estimated to lower unem-
ployment by about 0.35 per cent, while a 10 percentage point 
increase in trade openness is found to reduce aggregate unem-
ployment by about three-quarters of a percentage point (Dutt et 
al., 2009; Felbermayr et al., 2011). Using novel value-added trade 
statistics, one study finds that the 2004 EU Enlargement led to 
employment gains of up to 0.11% in EU15 countries (Kaplan et 
al., 2018).
Similarly, an input-output analysis of trade-induced labor 
demand changes finds that trade added close to one million 
jobs to the US economy from 1995 to 2011, mostly due to an 
increase in services exports (Feenstra and Sasahara, 2017). An 
important feature of the study for the purposes of this chapter 
is that it highlights how important input-output linkages are for 
the outcome. For instance, it shows that exports generated 4.1 
million additional jobs in services sectors, of which about 1.4 
million were not due to services exports but rather to services 
embedded in manufacturing exports through cross-sector value 
chain linkages.
Other studies have estimated the effect of trade on aggre-
gate employment by simulating the effects of trade flow or 
policy changes in structural models of trade. Applications of this 
approach lead to remarkably similar conclusions. For example, 
an analysis of the rise of Chinese import competition suggests 
that the US has experienced aggregate employment gains due 
to the expansion of services industries that benefit from cheap 
imported inputs (Adao et al., 2019; Caliendo et al., 2018). A 
related study on NAFTA emphasizes the relevance of taking 
input-output linkages into account in this approach by showing 
that in their absence some effects are underestimated by 50% 
(Caliendo and Parro, 2015).
One study with a similar approach finds that a return to 
most-favored-nation (MFN) tariffs between Britain and the 
EU-27 would lead to significant job losses in both Britain and 
the EU27. The same model predicts that a potential EU-US trade 
agreement, which would eliminate all import tariffs and reduce 
non-tariff barriers, would create about 0.35 million jobs in the US 
and over 1 million jobs in the EU. It then highlights that between 
60% and 72% of the employment effects of these policy shocks 
would be due to indirect effects caused by value chain linkages 
rather than due to direct effects (Vandenbussche et al., 2017; 
Vandenbussche et al., 2018).9 An advantage of these two studies 
is that they rely on value added trade data and, therefore, avoid 
the pitfalls of gross trade data pointed out by Jakubik and Stol-
zenburg (2018).
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National effects could also be inferred from intra-coun-
try studies. A study exploiting differences in exposure of US 
commuting zones to Chinese import competition finds that 
labor markets in more exposed regions perform better than 
less exposed labor markets as negative effects of trade on 
manufacturing employment are more than offset by trade-in-
duced gains in services employment (Wang et al., 2018). If 
less exposed labor markets incur only minimal employment 
and wage changes due to trade, then the effects of trade on 
labor market outcomes at the national level should be positive. 
Consequently, this approach further confirms the finding that 
trade leads to moderate but positive changes in labor market 
outcomes. Interestingly, the study also highlights, similar to 
Feenstra and Sasahara (2017) and Caliendo et al. (2018), that 
local job gains in services industries that benefit from cheap 
Chinese manufacturing inputs are of paramount importance for 
this finding.
Given the relative unanimity in the findings of studies that 
apply a large variety of methods, it is safe to conclude that trade 
has a small but positive effect on aggregate labor market out-
comes in advanced economies. Due to the changing industrial 
structure of advanced economies, these gains mainly accrue 
in the services sector where many high-income countries have 
a comparative advantage. Once again, assessing the question 
from a value chain perspective has a major impact on the results 
and is central to the conclusion.
4. Trade, GVCs, and regional divergence
The finding that trade leads to small positive labor market out-
comes at the aggregate level could conceal substantial het-
erogeneity in effects at the regional level. Since trade shifts 
resources across sectors and firms and since the distribution of 
sectors and firms across regions is not uniform, trade shocks 
should affect regions differently depending on their industrial 
structure. Indeed, the same research that was discussed for the 
debate on the decline in manufacturing shows that the effects of 
trade on labor markets vary considerably by region. 
Initial work found that in the absence of accounting for 
input-output linkages, rising imports lead to higher unemploy-
ment, lower labor force participation, and reduced wages in US 
local labor markets that are more exposed to Chinese imports 
relative to less exposed labor markets. This applies to directly 
exposed manufacturing workers, and in terms of wage losses also 
to workers in non-tradable services industries whose output suf-
fers from lower regional demand (Autor et al., 2013). Moreover, 
workers in exposed local labor markets appear to be reallocated 
to non-exposed industries and therefore experience greater 
job churning and reduced lifetime income as a consequence of 
increased imports from China (Autor et al., 2016; Asquith et al., 
2017). These results are also corroborated by studies that look at 
other advanced economies, including France, Germany, Norway 
and Spain (Autor et al., 2016; Malgouyres, 2017; Dauth et al., 
2014).
However, as was the case with manufacturing employment, 
once the effects of export expansion, cheaper inputs, and value 
chain linkages are added to the equation, the picture changes. 
Regions home to offshoring firms have benefitted from local 
employment gains due to employment expansion in offshoring 
firms and positive spill-over effects (Kovak et al., 2017). Moreover, 
the effect of import competition shocks can be attenuated at the 
regional level if job losses in some sectors or firms are compen-
sated by job creation in other sectors or firms in the same com-
muting zone. Trade opening often means both opening of the 
domestic market and improved access to export markets at the 
same time, and firms that gain access to foreign markets raise 
their exports and generate new jobs. One study concludes that 
since many import-competing regions in the US also export or 
benefit from cheaper inputs, the effects basically balance out 
and exposed and unexposed local labor markets follow a similar 
trend (Feenstra et al., 2017). Industrial diversification is therefore 
a key aspect for a fast and smooth regional adjustment to trade. 
Evidence from Germany shows that when regions are too con-
centrated, trade can widen regional disparities despite its posi-
tive aggregate effect (Yi et al., 2017).
As with exports, analyses of input-output linkages can 
uncover positive effects of import competition by illustrating 
how industries might benefit from cheaper inputs. The advan-
tage of analysis at the regional level compared to the with-
in-manufacturing level is that one can capture a wider set of 
industries that benefit from cheaper inputs. After all, many ser-
vices industries rely on manufacturing inputs as well. One study 
finds in this regard that Chinese imports raised US employment 
in the construction industry alone by 50,000 workers (Caliendo 
et al., 2018). More generally, the inclusion of the services sector 
in the analysis made possible by comparing regions is important 
because manufacturing represents only a small share of employ-
ment. According to data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. 
Louis, manufacturing accounted for only 20% of employment in 
Germany and 10% in the US in 2012. In contrast, industries that 
use manufacturing imports as inputs cover almost the entirety of 
employment. This observation is highlighted in Figure 2.3 which 
shows by how much industries are exposed to manufacturing 
import competition, differentiated into three different forms of 
exposure. The figure shows that while direct import competi-
tion is limited mainly to manufacturing, downstream exposure 
is prevalent in all sectors. This can explain why downstream 
employment creation can more than offset employment losses in 
upstream and directly exposed industries within the same local 
labor market, as shown by Wang et al. (2018).10
Finally, using value added data can show a very different 
picture of the geography of trade shocks than that indicated by 
analysis based on gross trade flows as Figure 2.4 shows. Loca-
tions specialized in downstream industries, in particular electrical 
machinery and electronic equipment, are much less exposed to 
import competition than what gross imports would suggest. On 
the other hand, the opposite holds for certain locations special-
ized in upstream manufacturing, including steel. Two extreme 
cases in this regard are San Jose, California, home to Silicon 
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Valley and many of the US’ main electronic equipment manufac-
turers, and North-West Indiana, home to the largest steel mill 
in the US and large aluminium producers. In these commuting 
zones, import competition in value added terms is more than a 
standard deviation different from gross import exposure (Jakubik 
and Stolzenburg, 2018). US regions specialized in consumer elec-
tronic production are clearly less exposed to import competition 
when it is measured in value added terms than what gross trade 
statistics would suggest, since high-tech imports contain both 
a high amount of US upstream content and inputs from other 
industries. On the other hand, gross trade statistics miss that 
upstream steel producers suffer when goods are imported that 
use foreign steel as an input because it implies lower demand for 
domestic steel.
To sum up, the effects of trade can differ markedly by region. 
Areas that benefit from export expansion or cheaper inputs 
experience wage and employment growth while areas that com-
pete with imports or have no access to foreign markets might fall 
behind. This creates considerable inequalities between regions, 
especially when regions are not sufficiently diversified. Although 
the general equilibrium effects of trade for aggregate employ-
ment are found to be positive, this highlights the need for policy 
intervention to facilitate adjustment in areas most affected by 
import competition.
FIGURE 2.3 The different forms of import exposure
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5. Trade, GVCs, and labor market polarization
This section finally turns to the question whether trade has con-
tributed to a polarization of labor markets in advanced economies. 
Polarization refers to a rise in low- and high-skilled employment 
at the expense of medium-skilled jobs and has been observed 
across a wide range of advanced economies, as can be seen in 
Figure 2.5. Trade may play a role here because it can significantly 
affect the composition of employment by task and by occupation, 
in addition to trade’s impact on the structure of employment by 
sector or by region. The new jobs that trade creates in more pro-
ductive sectors and firms are not necessarily the same as those 
that disappear in import-competing industries or firms. Rather, 
together with technology, trade tends to increase the demand for 
high-skilled workers compared to mid- and low-skilled workers, 
and to decrease the demand for mid-skilled workers performing 
routine tasks compared to both high- and low-skilled categories. 
In order to account for this, it is necessary to examine the effect of 
trade on the demand for specific tasks, distinguishing in particu-
lar between routine and non-routine tasks.
Both traditional and more recent trade theories predict that 
trade should raise the demand for high-skilled relative to low-
skilled workers. The traditional factor-endowment theory of 
comparative advantage predicts that trade will increase the rel-
ative demand for skills in an advanced economy that is relatively 
skill-abundant. More recent theories point out several additional 
channels through which trade can lead to an increasing demand 
for skills, not only in developed countries. For instance, an 
increase in the relative demand for high-skilled workers can come 
from a trade-induced change in the firm composition. When 
trade liberalization opens new trading opportunities, the most 
productive firms try to seize them and expand their production. 
At the same time, international trade stiffens competition in the 
domestic market, leading the least efficient firms to reduce their 
sales or close down. High-productivity expanding firms tend to 
be more skill-intensive than low-productivity downsizing firms, 
and therefore this change in firm composition may translate into 
an increase in the relative demand for high-skilled workers irre-
spective of the industry specialization (Helpman et al., 2010). In 
addition, trade may increase the rewards for skill-biased technical 
change, which further raises skill demand (Bustos, 2011). 
The rise of value chains is likely to have exacerbated this phe-
nomenon since it allows for the offshoring of not just complete 
production processes but production stages (Baldwin, 2016). 
Theory suggests that as offshoring costs fall, firms in developed 
economies can relocate more production stages to developing 
economies which will allow the former to technologically upgrade 
and specialize in a narrower set of stages that are relatively skill-in-
tensive corresponding to their comparative advantage (Feenstra 
and Hanson, 1995; Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2008; Lee 
and Yi, 2018). Moreover, foreign demand for high quality goods 
causes exporters to demand technological upgrading also from 
FIGURE 2.4 Difference in import exposure between gross trade and value added trade
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their suppliers which in turn have access to cheaper but more skill 
demanding inputs from abroad. This causes the upskilling effect 
to propagate through the supply chain. As a result, skill intensity 
has been shown to increase in close to one third of firms that nei-
ther import nor export (Fieler et al., 2018).
Empirical research supports the view that international trade 
increases the relative employment of skilled workers in devel-
oped countries. Detailed information on the skill structure within 
French manufacturing firms shows that firms employ relatively 
more skilled workers in marketing and development when they 
sell their products outside of France (Maurin et al., 2002). Other 
studies show that import competition leads to skill upgrading 
through its impact on product and process innovation. Using firm-
level data for twelve European countries over the period 1996 to 
2007, Bloom et al. (2016) estimate that increased trade with China 
accounted for about 15 per cent of the technology upgrading in 
Europe between 2000 and 2007. They also show that technology 
upgrading has had a significant impact on the relative employment 
of skilled workers. Supporting this evidence, an analysis of Belgian 
firms in the same period, 1996 to 2007, shows that import compe-
tition from China led to skill upgrading in low-tech industries (Mion 
and Zhu, 2013). The findings suggest that the response to imports 
from China accounted for 27 per cent of the increase in the share 
of non-production workers, and for almost half of the increase in 
the share of highly-educated workers in the low-tech industries.
Firm-level evidence from France shows that offshoring is 
associated with a lower relative demand for production work-
ers, especially for the less-skilled ones. Between 1986 and 1992, 
French manufacturing firms that increased their imports of final 
goods, and which were therefore likely to engage in offshoring 
of the assembly stage, changed their labor force composition 
towards non-production activities such as marketing or distribu-
tion (Biscourp and Kramarz, 2007). Evidence from the same study 
also shows that all types of offshoring, whether foreign sourc-
ing of final goods or intermediate inputs, are associated with an 
increase in the share of skilled workers such as engineers or tech-
nicians among the remaining production workers. Interestingly, 
the employment changes in this study were due to offshoring to 
other OECD countries, suggesting that skills upgrading within 
firms from high-income countries is not necessarily linked to off-
shoring to low-wage countries. Rather, it appears to be associ-
ated with increases in sourcing from foreign markets in general. 
Evidence from the United States further shows that imports of 
intermediate inputs from China mildly increased the relative 
employment of non-production workers compared to production 
workers (Wright, 2014). This upskilling effect has been magnified 
as domestic value chains have developed in China allowing for an 
even finer degree of specialization (Dollar et al., 2018).
Newly available data on occupational characteristics allows 
researchers to better characterize recent changes in the nature 
of work and the tasks required in each occupation beyond the 
high- vs low-skilled dichotomy. The types of tasks performed by 
a worker also determine whether a job is suitable to be offshored 
and whether it is susceptible to import competition from low-
wage countries. Occupations that require repetitive, easily cod-
ifiable tasks are easy to relocate or automate. Non-routine and 
manual occupations that require abstract thinking, face-to-face 
communication, or physical presence are much less tradeable 
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and automatable. Since routine tasks tend to be medium-skilled, 
manual tasks low-skilled and abstract tasks high-skilled, labor 
market polarization can arise with trade liberalization and techno-
logical progress.
Firm- and worker-level evidence shows that offshoring and 
import competition have a small positive impact on the demand 
for non-routine occupations and thus on job polarization. Off-
shoring by German multinational enterprises for example is asso-
ciated with an increase in non-routine and interactive tasks per-
formed in the onshore plants, and a higher share of high-skilled 
workers, accounting for about 10 to 15 per cent of these changes 
(Becker et al., 2013). Another recent study shows that in Denmark 
import competition from low-wage countries has led to a decline 
in routine, mid-skilled manufacturing occupations, and has there-
fore contributed to an overall shift in employment towards both 
high- and low-skilled occupations (Keller and Utar, 2016). Evi-
dence from the United States and Western Europe suggests that 
increased import competition measured at the occupation-level 
(rather than at the industry-level), and offshoring to low-income 
countries have brought about a relative decline in real wages, 
especially for low- and mid-skilled occupations intensive in rou-
tine tasks (Ebenstein et al., 2014). Import competition and off-
shoring are also found to reduce employment probabilities and 
wages for workers in exposed firms relative to those in export-
ing firms, thus leading to wage polarization between skill groups 
and firms (Hakkala and Huttunen, 2016; Utar, 2016; Hummels et 
al., 2014). Finally, services offshoring also increases the relative 
demand for high-skilled workers in non-routine occupations but 
the effect is economically small (Crinò, 2010; Crinò, 2012).
However, studies that take a wider range of potential drivers of 
polarization into account find that technology is significantly more 
important in driving polarization than import competition or off-
shoring in value chains (Goos et al., 2014; Autor et al., 2015; Zhu, 
2017). Two recent studies stand out for accounting explicitly for 
the rise of GVCs. The first builds a task-based model of produc-
tion in global value chains and decomposes observed changes in 
occupational labor demand into an automation and an offshoring 
component. It finds that while both factors have contributed to 
polarization in advanced economies, the effect of automation is 
dominant (Reijnders and de Vries, 2018). The second study goes 
a step further and decomposes changes in US labor demand into 
that due to participation in GVCs, competition from imports of 
Chinese final goods, and automation. The results suggest that 
import competition from China increased the share of low-skilled 
employment, while participation in GVCs increased the share of 
high-skilled employment. Trade as a combination of the two has 
thus contributed to polarization. The results for trade are however 
dwarfed by the estimates for the role of technology (Beverelli et 
al., 2018).
Independent of the exact driver, an increase in the demand 
for high- relative to low- or medium-skilled workers can translate 
into an increase in the share of skilled workers, an increase in the 
skill premium or a combination of both. In the short term, the 
supply of workers with a given skillset tends to be fixed and an 
increased demand for skills translates into increases in the skill 
premium, i.e. the ratio of wages commanded by high-skilled and 
low-skilled workers. This higher skill premium acts as a signal for 
workers to increase their skill levels and acquire the appropriate 
type of skills. When skill supply responds to market changes, 
employment of high-skilled workers increases and the skill pre-
mium tends to decrease. Increases in the skill premium can there-
fore be an important mechanism in upskilling the labor force and 
consequently in advancing economic development. Due to labor 
market rigidities, the response of skill supply to an increased skill 
premium can take several years, leading to a sustained wage 
polarization. The ease of adjustment chiefly depends on workers’ 
characteristics. While high-skilled workers can adjust to changes 
in skill demand more promptly than low-skilled workers, upskilling 
or re-skilling of low-skilled workers takes more time.
Evidence from the U.S. labor market suggests that low-wage 
workers churn primarily among manufacturing sectors, where 
they are repeatedly exposed to subsequent trade shocks, while 
high-wage workers are better able to move across employers with 
minimal earnings losses and are more likely to move out of man-
ufacturing conditional on separation (Autor et al., 2014; Krishna 
and Senses, 2014). Even when they move outside manufacturing, 
many workers faced with import competition have been shown 
to incur income losses as they land in low-skilled services jobs 
(Ebenstein et al., 2014). Danish evidence shows that workers in 
occupations that require cognitive skills either stay in mid-wage 
jobs or move upwards, and therefore are unaffected or benefit 
from import competition (Keller and Utar, 2016). It also shows 
that vocational training with a manufacturing focus makes mid-
wage workers less vulnerable to wage declines if they stay in their 
job but it does not shield them from being obliged to move into 
low-wage jobs. Post-secondary education and vocational training 
with an information technology focus, on the other hand, pre-
vents workers from having to move to low-wage jobs and strongly 
increases their chances of moving to high-wage jobs if they face 
import competition from a low-wage country.
To conclude, trade has contributed to an increase in the 
demand for skills and labor market polarization in advanced econ-
omies. While it is by far not the most important factor behind 
these trends, its role is relevant. To make sure that the gains from 
trade are shared more widely across individuals with different 
skills, policy interventions are thus necessary. This is the focus of 
the next section. 
6. Facilitating labor market adjustment to 
trade with GVCs
Economic openness, increased trade and investment, further inte-
gration in GVCs, and the diffusion of technology create greater 
wealth and opportunities, but they also induce job displacement 
and political discontent. By slowing the adjustment process, 
labor and capital market frictions generate an efficiency loss at 
the aggregate level which corresponds to the income and welfare 
that is foregone as the economy performs below its potential. 
Evidence suggests that following trade opening, unemployment 
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tends to increase before it decreases. A time-frame of 7 to 10 
years appears to be necessary for economies to return to their 
new steady state (Arias et al., 2013; Artuç et al., 2010). Three fac-
tors have been found to determine how easily countries adjust to 
trade, namely trade balances, the pattern of trade opening and 
the degree of regional diversification (Krugman, 2016a; Hakobyan 
and McLaren, 2016; Yi et al., 2017).
Adjustment processes also raise issues of equity, affecting the 
political support for an open economy. Even if on average the 
effects of trade are positive, workers with the wrong skills in neg-
atively affected regions and/or sectors can suffer important and 
persistent losses. Evidence on the effects of NAFTA on the US 
labor market suggests, for instance, that despite average nomi-
nal wages and overall employment remaining largely unaffected, 
certain workers who lived in more exposed areas or worked in 
more exposed sectors incurred earnings losses relative to less 
exposed peers (Hakobyan and McLaren, 2016). The combined role 
of location and industry exposure implied that a blue-collar foot-
wear worker without a high school degree in a town specializing in 
footwear production was hit across several dimensions. The study 
reports that in the most vulnerable regions and industries, high-
school dropouts experienced a decrease in wage growth over the 
decade of respectively 4 and 17 percentage points compared to 
similar workers that were less exposed. Evidence for Germany fur-
ther shows that the expansion of export-oriented sectors did not 
benefit workers displaced by import competition. Instead, gains 
in these industries accrued primarily to workers from the same 
sector, new labor market entrants, or previously unemployed 
workers (Dauth et al., 2016). This is confirmed by Danish data 
(Keller and Utar, 2016), which suggests that many displaced mid-
wage manufacturing workers moved into low-wage services jobs. 
As a result of these efficiency, equity, and political economy 
issues, there is a strong rationale for governments to take a closer 
look at the concerns associated with adjustment processes and 
to take the necessary action to address them. This section dis-
cusses how governments can facilitate adjustment to trade liber-
alization with a specific focus on the challenges that arise due to 
value chains.
Policies that governments can implement to lower the cost of 
adjustment to a changing trade environment fall into three main 
categories: general adjustment policies, which typically consist 
of some combination of active labor-market policies (such as job 
search assistance and training) and passive labor-market policies 
(including income support and social insurance programs); spe-
cific adjustment programmes; and other policies (including educa-
tion, infrastructure, credit market, trade, mobility and place-based 
policies) that do not directly intervene in labor markets. Available 
evidence on the effectiveness of these policies suggests that 
there is no one-size-fits-all recipe to reduce trade-related adjust-
ment costs (World Trade Organization (WTO), 2017).
General adjustment policies – which aim at addressing adjust-
ment problems independently of their cause - appear to be more 
adequate than specific trade adjustment policies for facilitat-
ing workers’ adjustment to trade in the presence of global value 
chains. Increasing input-output linkages between domestic and 
foreign firms have caused trade shocks to spread more widely in 
an economy, leading to indirect employment effects up and down 
the value chains. Therefore, it is increasingly difficult for adversely 
affected workers in up- or downstream firms to qualify for spe-
cific adjustment assistance. This means that not all of the adversely 
affected workers may be granted adjustment support, lowering 
the policy’s effectiveness in facilitating adjustment. Although spe-
cific adjustment policies (e.g., the US Trade Adjustment Assistance 
program or the European Global Adjustment Fund) do cover 
workers from adversely-affected, first-tier upstream or down-
stream producers, they fail to account for linkages between firms 
further up or down the value chain as well as linkages across bor-
ders. General adjustment policies have the advantage that they 
can also support workers in those firms that are indirectly affected 
but do not qualify for specific adjustment assistance due to size 
thresholds or the difficulty to establish a clear chain of causality. 
More generally, non-specific adjustment policies also support 
workers adversely affected by technological change and other 
shocks which induce adjustment processes that are difficult to dis-
entangle from, similar to and easy to confuse with those induced 
by trade. Figure 2.6 highlights that the scale and scope of these 
policies differs widely across advanced economies.
Training assistance and education programmes have an 
increasingly important role to play in facilitating adjustment to 
trade in global value chains. An important implication of value 
chain trade for labor markets is that it has transformed interna-
tional competition, which now impacts economies at a much finer 
resolution (Baldwin, 2016). Traditionally, countries specialized in 
industries in which they were most competitive. With the rise of 
global value chains, however, comparative advantage has shifted 
towards the level of production stages and specific tasks within 
value chains. This has important implications for workers that lose 
their jobs in the adjustment process. While before the age of value 
chains it was easier to transition from sunset to sunrise sectors 
offering their initial human capital, these workers may now face 
difficulties marketing their initial skill set which might have become 
obsolete. As their old task might have disappeared altogether, 
workers either upgrade their skill sets to perform new different 
tasks with equal or better pay or transition without training into 
low-wage jobs (Keller and Utar, 2016). Therefore, training assis-
tance programmes have become increasingly important in adjust-
ment policies compared to employment subsidies or job search 
assistance, as they help displaced workers to better respond to 
the changing demand for skills. Effective training assistance and 
education policies promote skills that are relevant for multiple 
industries, increasing workers’ flexibility and resilience in an unpre-
dictable job market (Baldwin, 2016).
Taking a value chain perspective and more broadly accounting 
for input-output linkages and exports when assessing the effects 
of trade on labor markets at the regional level does not alter 
the conclusion that these effects are likely to differ considerably 
between regions. What it does is to help identify these effects 
with more accuracy, thereby helping with the design of appro-
priate adjustment policies. Most adjustment policies have a role 
to play in addressing regional adjustment difficulties but mobility 
Trade, value chains and labor markets in advanced economies • 57
and place-based policies are the instruments of choice to address 
regional disparities in adjustment costs. When a region is nega-
tively affected by import competition, some of the workers who 
lose their jobs and cannot find a new one may be willing to move 
to a region where they can be re-employed. However, because of 
mobility frictions they may not be able to do so. Mobility policies 
consist in various measures aimed at lowering or eliminating such 
frictions. Place-based policies can usefully complement mobil-
ity policies by helping those who are negatively affected but are 
not willing to move. They can dampen negative effects of trade 
openness on local labor markets. Finally, new technologies can be 
utilized to bring regions that have fallen behind closer to hubs of 
innovation by reducing face-to-face constraints that are inherent to 
services delivery and many manufacturing processes. Technology 
also can enable training and education programs to reach a much 
wider and diverse audience at little cost. This can help to counter-
act the forces that promote regional disparities. Importantly, suc-
cessful coordination of the various policies requires cooperation 
between the different levels of government (Alden, 2017).
Trade in global value chains significantly affects the way gov-
ernments can promote their economies’ competitiveness. Tradi-
tionally, competitiveness policies aimed at fostering industries 
with the biggest spill-overs or at correcting market failures. They 
promoted investment in knowledge capital with government 
sponsored research, private-sector R&D subsidies and tax breaks, 
in human capital with policies linked to education, training and 
retraining, and in infrastructure and social capital. However, as 
production factors, in particular financial and knowledge capital, 
have become much more mobile, competitiveness policies need 
to be targeted at those factors that are naturally more “sticky” 
such as certain types of human, social and physical capital as 
well as infrastructure in order to retain the investment’s benefits. 
Moretti (2012) finds that highly skilled labor presents an attractive 
combination of low mobility with high spill-overs whereas finan-
cial capital gained for instance through tax breaks will likely flow 
to the place with highest return. As production structures are 
increasingly fragmented and productive factors increasingly more 
mobile, sectors have become the wrong operational unit with 
which to frame competitiveness and industrial policies. The focus 
now may rather be on cities as centres of excellence in a particular 
stage of production or developing to become a first-class centre 
(Baldwin and Evenett, 2012). In this perspective, cities should 
be seen as production hubs that provide a fast-adjusting range 
of diverse world-class services, including in particular inputs into 
manufactured exports, and a corresponding range of good jobs 
with a reasonably high level of resilience to international compe-
tition (Baldwin, 2016). With their localized social capital, cities can 
serve as the breeding ground of innovation and can be seen as the 
competitive frontier of developed economies in the 21st century. 
With more diversified labor markets they also allow for a greater 
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resilience of workers to adjust to changing economic conditions 
and can thereby improve the adjustment process (Yi et al., 2017).
Last but not least, with global value chains trade policy has 
become an even more problematic trade adjustment instrument 
than before, as its consequences for employment have become 
increasingly difficult to assess. While trade restrictions, for exam-
ple in the form of safeguards, can help domestic firms to adjust 
by temporarily limiting import competition and increasing their 
share in the domestic market, they also penalize export-oriented 
industries and industries that benefit from cheaper inputs. Tariffs 
on imports of intermediates, for instance, can increase the sourc-
ing cost of domestic exports and thereby worsen their competi-
tiveness. Moreover, increased import tariffs can also have a nega-
tive effect on domestic exporters if these are upstream suppliers 
of foreign firms adversely affected by the raised tariffs (Barbe and 
Riker, 2017). Vandenbussche et al. (2017) also point at the impor-
tance of such cross-border linkages for domestic employment. 
They estimate that a return to MFN tariffs between the UK and 
the EU would cause job losses since many British firms are import-
ant suppliers and buyers of continental European firms. Along the 
same lines, recent research suggests that spill-over effects due 
to supply chain linkages between manufacturing and non-manu-
facturing industries have become more important over time and 
should be taken into account when shaping trade policy (Kühn 
and Viegelahn, 2018).
7. Conclusions  
This chapter reviews research on the relationship between trade 
and labor markets in order to assess how trade has affected man-
ufacturing and aggregate employment, as well as regional and 
skill-based inequality in advanced economies. It adds to the 
existing literature by taking a value chain perspective which prop-
erly accounts for the rise of global value chains in the last three 
decades. Based on the review, it discusses how policy can facili-
tate adjustment to international trade when production is increas-
ingly fragmented across and within borders.
It highlights that value chain perspectives in labor market stud-
ies of international trade are crucial due to three factors. Firstly, 
value chains imply that trade shocks are felt much more broadly 
in economies since firms and industries are connected through 
input-output linkages. Secondly, value chains have magnified 
trade’s impact on skill demand by allowing for specialization 
not only across but also within sectors according to compara-
tive advantage. Thirdly, value chains make it necessary to com-
plement traditional gross trade statistics with novel value added 
trade statistics in order to correctly measure the volume and geo-
graphical incidence of trade shocks.
Taking these factors into account shows that trade leads to 
employment and wage gains at the national level, although in 
the case of employment these are small. At the sectoral level, it 
stresses that trade is unlikely to be a major driver of employment 
losses in manufacturing due to offsetting factors. While import 
competition can hurt employment in exposed industries and their 
suppliers, cheaper imports lower costs in downstream firms which 
allows them to expand. In addition, export expansion has bene-
fitted several manufacturing industries such that the combined 
effect of trade on manufacturing employment is likely to be minor.
However, moving from the nation-wide and sectoral level to 
regional and individual outcomes reveals substantial heterogene-
ity in how these aggregate effects map out. For instance, when 
local labor markets within countries are not sufficiently diversi-
fied, trade can widen regional disparities. Regions specialized 
in import-competing and upstream industries can fall behind, 
while areas with industries that export or benefit from cost sav-
ings pull away. Similarly, trade can lead to labor market polariza-
tion by favouring high-skilled employment over medium-skilled 
employment. While other factors like technological progress 
have contributed more significantly to these phenomena, policy 
can ensure a more even distribution of the gains from trade by 
addressing these inequalities.
The chapter finds that value chains make targeted or spe-
cific interventions increasingly difficult. As input-output linkages 
cause trade shocks to spread more widely within economies, 
import competition is less and less limited in terms of industries, 
regions, or skill levels. As a consequence, it becomes important 
for policies that ease adjustment to trade to be more general and 
less dependent on affected workers fulfilling certain conditions. 
This is especially the case as value chains magnify trade-induced 
changes in skill requirements and thereby raise the demand for 
worker flexibility and the need for training support.
In sum, this review shows that trade benefits on average not only 
consumers but also workers. This finding goes against common 
views in public discussions and highlights the need for better com-
munication on the benefits of trade. It also shows that there is an 
important part to play for policy as these benefits tend to cluster 
regionally and among individuals with the right characteristics.
As always, a number of caveats apply. Beyond those that per-
tain to the generalization of country-specific results, two caveats 
are worth emphasizing here. First, this paper does not discuss 
the effects of trade in the presence of value chains on other out-
comes such as, for example, labor force participation, employ-
ment volatility, the geographical mobility of workers, the labor 
share of income, or indirect effects on political, sociological, or 
health outcomes, etc. This is mostly because of a lack of evidence, 
but also because there seems to be considerable heterogeneity 
even among developed countries with regard to the evolution 
of these variables. Note, however, that it is not unreasonable to 
assume that evidence concerning these other effects would be 
in line with the evidence on sectoral and regional employment. 
Second, some indirect effects of trade, notably on technology 
and productivity, are not taken into account. This means that a 
clean separation of the effects of trade from those of technology, 
a notoriously difficult objective to achieve given the strong inter-
actions between trade and technology and the isomorphic nature 
of their effects, remains somewhat elusive. This should certainly 
not be seen as an argument against trade adjustment policies but 
rather as another reason why general adjustment policies should 
be prefered to specific trade adjustment programs.
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Notes
1. These numbers are based on an accounting exercise. They are not 
meant to suggest that an equivalent number of jobs would disappear 
in autarky. Note that the estimates are likely upward biased as export-
ing firms tend to have a higher import content than non-exporting 
firms and higher productivity and current input-output tables are not 
able to differentiate between the two.
2. Sales and distribution of imports in particular to households are also 
important contributors to jobs but not covered in this section. See 
Chapter 8 for details.
3. See for instance, Krugman’s (1994, p. 25) famous quote: “It should 
be possible to emphasize to students that the level of employment 
is a macroeconomic issue […] with microeconomic policies like tariffs 
having little net effect.”
4. See, e.g., Helpman (2016), Muendler (2017), and WTO (2017).
5. Authors’ calculation based on OECD-WTO TiVA data.
6. Positive downstream effects of Chinese imports have also been shown 
for Japanese firm sales (Fabinger et al., 2017).
7. Wang et al. (2018) argue that to properly capture the impact on down-
stream producers it is for instance central to differentiate between 
intermediate and final goods imports, since only the former has the 
potential to reduce input prices. Failing to do so will lead to mea-
surement error biasing estimates towards zero. Similarly, cross-border 
input trade might differ from intra-country input trade. The assump-
tion that US industries source nationally in the same way as from 
abroad ignores that countries specialize within value chains and thus 
provide different types of inputs. This equally causes measurement 
error.
8. In the age of value chains gross trade data suffers from double count-
ing when intermediates cross the same border twice. If for example, 
China produces phone cases and ships them to the US where high-
tech components are inserted before the phone travels back to China 
for final assembly, then the phone case would be counted twice by 
gross trade data.
9. Carrere et al. (2015) find a small increase in the US unemployment 
rate due to a potential EU-US trade agreement but they don’t account 
for input-output linkages. Moreover, they show that replacing NAFTA 
with 20% import tariffs would increase unemployment by 6% in the 
US and 21% in Mexico, an effect that might become even larger with 
input-output linkages that magnify sectoral effects.
10. As was the case for manufacturing employment, Acemoglu et al. 
(2016) and Caliendo et al. (2018) find a more muted balancing effect 
of input-output linkages on regional disparity due to the issues out-
lined in the section on manufacturing employment.
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